As a group, institutions don't beat passive indexing either.

February 14, 2025

Look at this beauty I found.

The abstract:

CIOs [Chief Investment Officers] and consultant-advisors oversee about $10 trillion of institutional assets in the US. They have underperformed passive management by one to two percentage points a year since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (GFC). They rely heavily on expensive alternative investments; and the more they have in alternatives, the worse they do. Large institutions use scores of managers, making them high-cost closet indexers. Inefficiency abounds.

The red color above is mine. Long-time readers of this newsletter know I don't use highlighter much, but I couldn't help myself.

So institutional firms that have large budgets for investment advice as a group did not outperform passive management. The key takeaway is that more money does not lead to a performance edge.

Also, good luck when someday they have to close out those alternative positions and mark them to market in the process. Some of our clients have discovered, as those positions get closed out, that the bids come in lower than recorded on the statements.

In credit to the institutional managers, their arguments are etymological showcases. Words like "alternatives," "color," "tail risk," and everyone's favorite: "synergy."¹

What is going on here? All this high-powered talent and they can't outperform? All those years studying through school, getting the B- on the organic chemistry final and pulling the panic ripcord, switching to a finance track from pre-med but ending up at Chase instead of Goldman, eventually realizing that's ok but brushing up on the vocabulary (see above, I'm working on it) to get an in-house institutional position because it's going to be less pressure and also easier on kindergarten drop-off days? But then you become an institutional manager, and you can't beat the plain-vanilla index? What?

The problem they are trying to solve is exceedingly difficult. At its core, you can be correct in your investment thesis, but perhaps not correct enough. There are so many variables swimming around that you have to weigh them all accurately, an impossible task. The human mind likes stories and theses, and it attaches to storylines in securities analyses that sound reasonable. But it is all of the other storylines that you may not have weighed correctly that can overwhelm the choice you made.

There is another difficulty I have noticed over the years. A lot of securities analysts have been doing that job their whole lives. Many of them haven't been in operating businesses. And that's a disadvantage. For example, in high school I worked at CVS as a floor stocker. I would have to go through hundreds of little tubes of lipstick and repack the ones that didn't sell by a certain date. This was eye-opening to me one because I didn't know you could theoretically come up with that many variants of red, and two because I couldn't believe how many problems resulted just from this repack operation.

I could see the cost related to that complexity. When something like Trader Joe's shows up, with their simplified model versus Kroger, I intuitively know all the steps on the floor that no one has to do. In theory you can see this on paper, but sometimes doing the job itself, or experience in an industry, gives you insights that you believe more strongly.

Before signing off, I'll note that I'm not sure that an analyst with industry experience would matter anyway. The markets are so efficient that the benefit in today's world might be instantly competed away, and the passive indexes would still outperform you.

Dan Cunningham

1. I love the term "synergy." In 2001 Smucker's bought Jif Peanut Butter from Proctor & Gamble. The investment bankers were crowing about "the synergy between the peanut butter and the jelly." I thought "this is a job I can always do as a backup if needed."